.gif)
.png)
Nepali Leftism in the Light of Xi Jinping Thought
A Strategic Retrospective and Roadmap
The Present in the Light of Historical Heritage
Even after the so-called uprising in the name of Generation Z, a review of Nepal's political history reveals that the communist movement is not merely a political stream; rather, it is a powerful movement established as a guardian of radical transformation, social consciousness, and nationalism in Nepali society. Established in 2006 BS (1950 AD) under the leadership of Pushpa Lal Shrestha, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) contested the 2015 BS general election and secured four seats—a journey that eventually culminated in securing nearly a two-thirds majority in the 2017 general election. For any political party, this trajectory is in itself a glorious and extraordinary achievement.
Grounded in the Jhapa Uprising, historical democratic movements, and the decade-long People's War, the Nepali leftist movement played a historic role in abolishing feudalism, establishing a federal democratic republic, and bringing the marginalized classes, castes, and regions into the mainstream of the state.
However, the historical legacy can no longer continuously mask the current crisis facing the left. In particular, the dramatic dissolution of the historic leftist unity in 2017, subsequent continuous fragmentation, and the recurring power-centric coalition games for government formation have plunged Nepali leftism into a deep ideological and organizational crisis.
Although the share of pro-leftist votes remained significant in the 2081 BS (2024 AD) elections, the division of these votes weakened the influence of leftist forces in parliament. This situation has deepened frustration among leftist supporters and voters, while continuous internal squabbling within parties has generated a sense that the very existence of the leftist movement is under threat.
In Nepali politics, the political influence of Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' has visibly declined at the societal level. On the other hand, the CPN (UML), under the leadership of K.P. Sharma Oli, faced unexpected electoral setbacks, creating serious political ripples. As the leadership—which reduces power politics to mere calculations and profit-loss transactions—grows weaker, many leaders and cadres who made politics the basis of their livelihoods have become directionless.
Although the leftist-majority Constituent Assembly promulgated a "socialism-oriented" constitution, in practice, successive leftist-led governments became witnesses to the flourishing of comprador capitalism across most sectors of Nepali society. Today, the UML, the Maoist Centre, and other leftist parties remain trapped in this ideological and organizational vicious cycle.
Amidst such a moment of crisis, a correction in the political direction of Nepali leftism is essential. Furthermore, the framework for rebuilding leftist organizations has become an equally crucial question. In this context, a serious study of the "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" adopted by neighboring China, along with the economic, social, and organizational achievements attained under the ideological leadership of President Xi Jinping, may present some prospective exits.
China's rise as an economic superpower, its unprecedented success in poverty alleviation, and the strict discipline established within the party can serve as instructive aspects for the Nepali left. However, the challenge of maintaining a balance between ideological attraction toward the Chinese model and Nepal’s specific geopolitical, constitutional, and social realities remains complex.
To what extent can the organizational concepts of Xi Jinping Thought be transformed and applied to Nepali soil? Finding an objective answer to this question has become an indispensable necessity for both the Nepali leftist intellectual circle and political leadership.
Geopolitical Sensitivity and the Policy of Non-Alignment
Nepal's geographical location is simultaneously both a challenge and an opportunity. Much like historians describing Nepal as a "yam between two boulders," Nepal stands today at the sensitive center of growing strategic competition among global and regional powers in world politics. Situated between two influential neighbors—China in the north and India in the south—Nepal's foreign policy has always remained as challenging as "walking on the edge of a sword." In recent years, changes in the global power balance, the Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have deepened Nepal's geopolitical sensitivity.
In such a situation, if Nepali leftist parties attempt to study certain organizational concepts or management methodologies developed under "Xi Jinping Thought" and use them as reference materials for organizational reforms, Southern and Western powers are likely to view it with strategic concern. They may interpret it as an expansion of Chinese political influence in Nepal or as a dimension of Beijing's "soft power" strategy. Consequently, the potential for increased ideological debate, political polarization, and external diplomatic pressure within Nepal cannot be ruled out.
The internal political disputes and external diplomatic reactions witnessed during Nepal's ratification of the US-funded Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, alongside various infrastructure, connectivity, and development projects pursued with China, serve as direct examples of this geopolitical sensitivity. This clarifies that every strategic decision made by Nepal is not merely an internal political matter but is deeply intertwined with the international balance of power.
Therefore, remaining unswerving from the principles of non-alignment and Panchsheel—the foundational pillars of Nepal's foreign policy—and safeguarding national interests, ideological autonomy, and policy independence is a strategic imperative for the Nepali left. Learning from China's economic development, poverty alleviation, governance, long-term planning, and organizational management is one thing; applying them verbatim to the Nepali political system is an entirely different matter. The Nepali leftist leadership must deeply understand this clear distinction.
Nepal can develop close relations with China in economic cooperation, connectivity, technology transfer, infrastructure development, and investment expansion. However, maintaining the capacity to make independent political, ideological, and policy decisions based on national needs, constitutional arrangements, and democratic values is the true essence of a non-aligned foreign policy. Therefore, instead of emulating any foreign political model, the Nepali left should adopt an approach of transforming and internalizing positive experiences to suit Nepal's historical, social, constitutional, and geopolitical realities. This balanced perspective can effectively protect Nepal's sovereignty, diplomatic credibility, and national autonomy while making the Nepali left more ideologically mature and credible.
Multiparty Democratic Structure and the Compatibility of Chinese Thought
The core essence of Xi Jinping Thought is grounded in a democratic system operating under the "single-party and centralized" leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Xi Thought maintains the principle that "the Party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country—east, west, south, north, and center." Because the demarcation line between the party and state power in China is relatively thin, the party's decisions systematically function as state laws.
In contrast, Nepal's current political and constitutional reality is entirely different. The Constitution of Nepal (2015) guarantees a multiparty competitive democratic system, periodic elections, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, fundamental rights, and human rights. The Nepali leftist movement itself has long been accustomed to parliamentary and democratic practices. Ideological tenets such as the "People's Multiparty Democracy" (Janta ko Bahudali Janaraj/Jabaj) advanced by the erstwhile CPN (UML) and the "Development of Democracy in the 21st Century" accepted by the erstwhile CPN (Maoist) upon entering the peace process have developed leftist parties as skilled players within the framework of multiparty competition.
Under this condition, the question naturally arises: how can Xi Thought—which succeeded in a single-party political system—be adapted within a multiparty democratic structure? The solution lies not in the verbatim copy of Xi Thought, but in creative receptivity aligned with democratic methods. Xi Thought contains several non-political yet administrative and ethical dimensions that can be easily internalized within Nepal's multiparty system:
-
Zero Tolerance for Corruption: Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign in China, targeting both "tigers and flies," can serve as one of the greatest lessons for leftist parties in Nepal. Public trust is growing stronger that the core leadership within leftist parties and their affiliated organizations are themselves primary drivers of corruption in Nepali society. To curb the patronage culture, corrupt wealth accumulation, and neo-flourishing bourgeois trends fostered by these leaderships, strict discipline and internal democratic investigation systems can be implemented. This can serve as a starting point to restore public trust in leftists and reclaim lost grassroots bases.
-
People-Centric Working Line: In multiparty competition, the people's mandate is the source of legitimacy. Nepali communists can elevate the "people-centered" philosophy of Xi Thought from a mere vehicle for winning elections into a medium for delivering governance and service delivery through local governments. By increasing the involvement of local, district, and provincial party committees in planning from local levels up to provincial and central governments, and by restructuring party departments in alignment with state structures rather than leader-centric budget allocations, parties can become more accountable to the people than to individual leaders. This makes it possible to build a system where ordinary supporters and cadres—not just leaders assuming state responsibilities—feel a sense of ownership.
-
Meritocracy and Competence Systems: In the Communist Party of China, promotions and responsibilities are ensured based on leaders' functional capability, service delivery, and results. To achieve this, systematic methods of regular classes and specialized workshops are conducted for sectoral cadre development. Cadres who excel in these party-run trainings are systematically promoted to higher responsibilities. However, in the case of Nepali leftist parties, the distorted application of Jabaj under the guise of democratization has led to the cultivation of favorites favored by powerful leaders. Consequently, when leadership holding party positions itself lacks competence, these incompetent figures build strong interest groups for political protection, reinforcing factionalism and nepotism in current realities. Re-establishing the meritocracy and competence systems implemented by the CPC alone can resolve problems seen in organizational mobilization and planning.
Internal Resistance, Ideological Dogmatism, and Subjective Review
The greatest roadblock on the path of the Nepalization of Chinese thought may not simply be external powers or constitutional complexities, but the internal resistance and ideological dogmatism residing within the leftist parties themselves. Historically, the Nepali leftist movement has been afflicted by ideological dogmatism and self-complacency.
On one hand, a section within leftist parties remains tied to the rigid formulas of 20th-century classical Marxism-Leninism or Maoism. For them, Marxism is not a dynamic science but a religious scripture. This faction prefers to remain within a narrow enclosure, branding any new idea or experiment as "revisionism" or "rightist deviation."
On the other hand, the core leadership and a large fraction of the party have fallen prey to rightist opportunism disguised under the veneer of progressive leftism. Over the past decade, a widespread trend has emerged where grand speeches on principle and theory are made, but in practice, policy, integrity, and ideals are staked for the acquisition of power and authority.
Furthermore, a vacuum of ideological study among leftist cadres is today's reality. The fraternal organizations serving as nurseries for theory and ideology within these parties (such as student unions and youth wings) have fostered a sentiment of contributing to revolution by acting as "bodyguards" and "private servants" of leaders rather than engaging in creative work, labor, and production.
The contemporary Nepali leftist movement suffers from a scarcity of the habit of "listening and contemplating." When Xi Jinping Thought is mentioned, it either risks being turned into a political gimmick to please China or is subjected to blind opposition without understanding its utility and depth. Just as Xi Jinping "Sinicized Marxism" by linking it to 21st-century Chinese reality, the question of why Nepali leaders are failing to achieve the "Nepali-ization of Marxism" is more poignant here.
Imposing Xi Thought discipline within organizations of Nepali leftist parties today carries the risk of internal resistance labeled as "authoritarian and anti-democratic" steps. This can be attributed to leaders and cadres of Nepali leftist parties being accustomed to a loose, anarchic, and unpolitical organizational culture.
To curb anarchism—where cadres fail to pay dues, skip meetings, and slander their own leadership on social media—leadership itself must be morally clean, ideologically firm, and proficient in knowledge. However, regrettably, the greatest problem in leftist parties today is the drought of questioning, ethical, and competent leadership.
A Roadmap for Strengthening Leftist Party Organizations and Fraternal Bodies
If the mainstream of Nepali leftism is to be preserved, restructuring can no longer happen through old, conventional methods. Under this condition, strengthening party organizations and the fraternal bodies serving as nurseries of political training is an indispensable prerequisite. To accomplish this, leftist parties can borrow organizational technologies from Xi Jinping Thought and adapt them to Nepali conditions by adopting the following concrete strategies:
-
Discipline and Investigation Systems: To maintain party discipline in the organizational sphere by adopting the Chinese model, an independent internal discipline commission should be formed immediately with a zero-tolerance policy on corruption and strict investigations into suspects, alongside regular audits of leaders' assets and lifestyles.
-
Regular Ideological Training: Adopting the model provided by Xi Thought in ideological training, regular ideological reconstruction and party study schools and workshops should be conducted regarding leftism and the current Nepali political framework, developing a practice of mandatory study circles down to the cell committees. Digital platforms can be utilized to conduct regular classes for such trainings.
-
Restructuring of Fraternal Organizations: Keeping in mind that fraternal organizations are nurseries producing committed cadres for the future, they must be linked to production and technology. Party systems should be established to mobilize student and youth organizations from street and university politics into start-ups, cooperatives, entrepreneurship, and social service. This will prevent these organizations from turning into organized groups of brokers, contractors, extortionists, and smugglers.
-
Merit-Based Leadership Development: Establishing a merit-based leadership selection method is another major task for contemporary leftism. Xi Thought takes qualification, competence, and service delivery as primary aspects for cadre promotions. Proper application of this policy ensures that during electoral ticket distribution or other assignments, systems are established to look at field-level performance and popularity indexes rather than factional loyalty.
Fraternal organizations should not be recognized merely as forces hurling stones or burning tires among the public and society. They must be transformed into "productive forces" akin to the Chinese model. Leftist youth committees organized in every municipality and ward should work as local catalysts promoting agriculture, cooperatives, environmental conservation, and technology. When fraternal organizations become companions in the daily joys and sorrows of the people, the social roots of leftism will grow robust.
Conclusion: Originality as the Only Alternative for Leftist Revival
Today, the Nepali version of leftism stands face-to-face with the gravest crisis in its history. On one side, the storm of capitalist consumerism in Nepali society is moving at a rapid pace, turning the consciousness of the proletariat and the political groups claiming to represent them into commodities sold in the luxury market. On the other side, Nepali leftist political organizations are growing hollow due to internal fragmentation, factionalism, ideological bankruptcy, and compradorization.
To resolve this grave crisis, the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics and Xi Jinping Thought have the potential to play an important role. However, claiming that this remedy is the sole indispensable "prepared medicine" to solve the problems seen in the Nepali left would also be flawed. Nepal has its own specific geopolitical sensitivity, distinct constitutional political structures, varied thought, and a social structure containing pluralistic ideas. We possess an inclusive constitution stating our own democratic and socialist system, which guarantees multiparty competition. This characteristic does not permit us to blindly emulate political ideas successfully implemented anywhere else in the world.
Therefore, to preserve the mainstream of the Nepali left, embracing the soul of Xi Thought—namely "strict discipline, dedication to the people, and ideological dynamism"—while molding its external shell to suit Nepali soil, culture, and democratic values can initiate a journey toward deliverance from the current crisis. Furthermore, charting a strategy where the Nepali left learns discipline and the model of economic prosperity from China while defending democracy and freedom from the West and its own history would be an appropriate path.
From the balanced amalgamation of these two dimensions, a new roadmap of a political idea of "Socialism with Nepali Characteristics" can be forged to break the vicious cycle of "election-to-election" brought by Jabaj. This very socialism with Nepali characteristics can become an appropriate leftist ideology to sustain renewed public trust in the left. Should all leftist supporters think once seriously on whether this is the sole fact-based and scientific path for the revival and preservation of the Nepali left?
